Vahideh Hosseinikhah Manshadi
Michael H. Jordan Professor of OperationsAbout
Research
Publications
2025
Online Algorithms for Matching Platforms with Multichannel Traffic
Manshadi V, Rodilitz S, Saban D, Suresh A. Online Algorithms for Matching Platforms with Multichannel Traffic. Management Science 2025, 71: 7674-7691. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.00910.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchExternal trafficTwo-sided platformsRevenue managementMarketing analyticsOnline appendixOmar BesbesWebsite trafficInternational trafficMatching platformTrafficRecommendation algorithmStrong performancePerformance of ACOnline algorithmPlatform problemsNumerical studyTargeting opportunitiesCompetitive ratioOnline matchingExternal linksNonprofitsAdaptive capacityOpportunitiesMarketRevenueWhy the Rooney Rule Fumbles: Limitations of Interview-stage Diversity Interventions in Labor Markets
Farajollahzadeh S, Lee S, Manshadi V, Monachou F. Why the Rooney Rule Fumbles: Limitations of Interview-stage Diversity Interventions in Labor Markets. 2025, 919-919. DOI: 10.1145/3736252.3742648.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchInformation asymmetryLabor marketFirm-level competitivenessRepresentation of disadvantaged groupsRational firmsIndividual levelRooney RuleDiverse interventionsFirmsMarketHiring processInterview decisionsInterview settingHiring stageUnique equilibriumHiringHiring outcomesMatching valuesDisadvantaged groupsSocial groupsInterview stageCompetitionLaborInterviewsNegative effectsRobust Dynamic Staffing with Predictions
Feng Y, Manshadi V, Niazadeh R, Neyshabouri S. Robust Dynamic Staffing with Predictions. 2025, 87-87. DOI: 10.1145/3736252.3742496.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchMinimax optimal policyFinite time horizonLP solutionOptimal costRestricted adversaryImbalance costsOptimal policyOnline algorithmMinimaxLast-mile delivery operationsPrediction intervalsSequence of predictionsTime horizonWorker availabilityTarget demandCosts of hiringDelivery operationsUncertainty intervalsProblemAccurate predictionDynamic staffing
2024
Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement
Lo I, Manshadi V, Rodilitz S, Shameli A. Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2024, 26: 1787-1805. DOI: 10.1287/msom.2020.0426.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchFood Rescue U.S.Optimal myopic policyAdoption levelTwo-sided marketsOptimal design cruciallyMyopic policyTwo-sided platformsVolunteer management literatureMarket thicknessMarket participantsLevel of adoptionManagement literatureOnline appendixOptimal policyCrowdsourcing platformsConstant-factor approximationMarketVolunteer characteristicsPolicyFood recovery organizationsTrade-OffsAdoptionTaskCommitmentPlatformCommitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement
Lo I, Manshadi V, Rodilitz S, Shameli A. Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement. 2024, 674-674. DOI: 10.1145/3670865.3673488.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchMarket thicknessOptimal level of commitmentMatching functionLevel of commitmentOptimal myopic policyMyopic policyFood Rescue U.S.Random marketsSpot marketMarket participantsCrowdsourcing platformsMatching efficiencyMarketTwo-sided marketplacesOptimal levelPolicyTrade-OffsNegative impactPromote growthConstant-factor approximationVolunteer characteristicsRecurring tasksFood recovery organizationsMatching processDynamic Matching with Post-allocation Service and its Application to Refugee Resettlement
Bansak K, Lee S, Manshadi V, Niazadeh R, Paulson E. Dynamic Matching with Post-allocation Service and its Application to Refugee Resettlement. 2024, 673-673. DOI: 10.1145/3670865.3673572.Peer-Reviewed Original Research
2023
Fair Dynamic Rationing
Manshadi V, Niazadeh R, Rodilitz S. Fair Dynamic Rationing. Management Science 2023, 69: 6818-6836. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4700.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchMinimum fill rateFederal Emergency Management AgencySequence of demandsEmergency Management AgencyDemand-to-supply ratioRevenue managementMarketing analyticsSocial goodCorrelated demandsPolicyOnline appendixOmar BesbesAdaptation policiesSocial plannerManagement agenciesTheoretical guaranteesConditional momentsUpper boundFilling rateCOVID-19 pandemicEfficient rationingAllocation challengesMedical suppliesTheoretical developmentsDesigning Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms
Immorlica N, Lucier B, Manshadi V, Wei A. Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms. Management Science 2023, 69: 4609-4626. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4601.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchSocial welfareTwo-sided matching marketsUnique stationary equilibriumDecentralized two-sided matching marketFirst-best social welfareEquilibrium social welfareImproved approximation factorMeeting rateStationary equilibriumMatching marketsAgents' incentivesOptimal welfareOmar BesbesBipartite graphsIncentive issuesSearch designAgent typesApproximation factorOnline appendixConstant factorWelfareMarketMarketing analyticsSearch problemDesign problemLearning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users
Golrezaei N, Manshadi V, Schneider J, Sekar S. Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users. Operations Research 2023, 71: 1171-1196. DOI: 10.1287/opre.2022.2380.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchFake usersOnline learning algorithmLearning algorithmsProduct rankingDetect fake usersEfficient learning algorithmClick farmingImplementing multiple levelsMachine learning algorithmsE-commerce platformsFraudulent behaviorFraudulent usersSuboptimal rankingsUser feedbackCorrupted dataData analyticsFraudulent actorsE-commerceOptimal rankingOnline platformsUsersTD managementDisplay orderLearning methodologyAlgorithmInformation Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion
Anunrojwong J, Iyer K, Manshadi V. Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion. Management Science 2023, 69: 3778-3796. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4548.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchHigh-need usersEffectiveness of information designKnowledge of users’ typesPrivate outside optionsAbsence of price discriminationFirst-come-first-served queueRevenue managementMarketing analyticsGabriel WeintraubReduce congestionPrice discriminationStylized modelE-companionImprove social outcomesImprove welfareService providersFull informationWelfare outcomesCongestionCentralized admissionsInformation designUser typesWaiting timeHeterogeneous usersWelfare